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Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Dr. H. S. Craig

DATE: May 31, 1955

FROM : Lt. Col. P. J. Corso *PJC*

SUBJECT: Comments on USIA Paper, "Some Psychological Factors Relating to the Projected Big Four Meeting"

Survey findings were taken from West Germany, France, Italy and Great Britain from a relatively small number of people, and probably from Rome, London and Paris. During my stay in Rome, Prime Minister De Gasperi and his Ministers cautioned me repeatedly not to use opinions or activities in Rome as a yardstick for the remainder of Italy. They stated that the atmosphere, emotions and opinions were generally not in step with the rest of the country. I believe the same is true of Washington, D. C. A good example is the Quemoy-Matsu problem. Statements, newspapers, etc., convey the attitude they are not worth fighting over, yet the Hon. George H. Bender, in a survey among his constituents in Ohio, discovered the following: Defend Quemoy-Matsu - Yes, 11,425; No - 2,829. Use atomic weapons - Yes, 12,121; No, 2,670. Defend Formosa - Yes, 13,723; No - 1,282.

Therefore, disregarding the above and proceeding from the assumption that the findings are a good cross-section of the countries named, the following comments are made:

1. War, Peace and Atomic Weapons. - These polls reveal that the Soviet peace campaigns have had a decided effect in creating fear and confusion especially in the field of atomic weapons. U.S. handling of the subject from a psychological point of view has done little to counter Soviet propaganda.

2. The Threat of Soviet Military Aggression. - This poll reveals an inherent mistrust of the Soviet Union. It also reveals that there is a misunderstanding of U.S. intentions, since in many cases it reveals either distrust or confusion toward U.S. objectives.

3. Neutrality. - This reveals a distrust of the U.S.S.R., but a dangerous leaning toward neutrality.

4. Peaceful Coexistence. - Reveals definite gains for the Soviet propaganda campaign and a definite need to explain the nature of "Peaceful Coexistence - Soviet Style."

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5. Big Four Conference and German Reunification. - Definitely in favor of U.S., but reveals a great deal of misunderstanding, confusion and lack of knowledge of U.S. objectives.

6. Western European Union versus a Neutral Reunified Germany. - Poll favors U.S. objectives, but again reveals a lack of knowledge of the real issues.

7. Danger of Communist Subversion. - Reveals a definite lack of knowledge of the nature and control of Communist parties by the Soviet Union.

8. Communist Chinese Participation in the Projected Conference. - Poll favors U.S. objectives, but 39 percent agree or have no opinion on Chinese Communist participation. This reveals that much needs to be done in order to unmask the nature and objectives of the Chinese Communist regime.

Conclusion

Although the poll shows a favorable opinion toward U.S. and Western objectives, it reveals that a large segment lacks knowledge or is not aware of U.S. objectives. It also reveals that Soviet propaganda has been successful in numerous fields. In many cases, the Soviets have achieved their results through default on the part of the U.S. In order to prepare for any eventualities which might arise at the Big Four Conference, it is necessary that the U.S. begin a positive, dynamic program to explain its objectives and expose the nature of Soviet tactics against strategic concepts.

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